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It is the policy of Cornell University actively to support equality 
of educational and employment opportunity. No person shall be 
denied admission to any educational program or activity or be 
denied employment on the basis of any legally prohibited dis­
crimination involving, but not limited to, such factors os race, 
color, creed, religion, national or ethnic origin, sex, age or 
handicap. The University is committed to the maintenance of 
affirmative action programs which will assure the continuation 
of such equality of opportunity.
William I. Myers (1891-1976) was one of the early agricultural economists who 
worked on problems of agricultural finance. He was appointed a full professor of 
farm finance at Cornell University in 1920, In 1932, Professor Myers was asked to 
prepare recommendations for a legislative program to solve the agricultural finance 
problems of those times. His proposals found approval from President-elect 
Roosevelt, and his ideas formed the foundation for the creation of the Farm Credit 
Administration and the present Federal Cooperative Farm Credit System. Then, at 
the request of President Roosevelt, he was granted a leave of absence from Cornell 
in March, 1933, to serve as assistant to Henry Morganthau, then chairman of the 
Federal Farm Board. Morganthau was appointed the first governor of FCA, and Myers 
became Deputy Governor. Then, when Morganthau became Secretary of the Treasury in 
September, 19.33, Myers was appointed governor of the Farm Credit Administration.
He served in that capacity until 1938 when he returned to Cornell University as 
head of the Department of Agricultural Economics. In 1943, he became Dean of the 
College of Agriculture serving until 1959.
The purpose of the W. I. Myers Memorial Lecture is to bring to this campus 
an outstanding agricultural finance economist to lecture on a'timely topic. The 
lecture is sponsored by the Cornell University Department of Agricultural Economics 
as a part of its continuing emphasis in agricultural finance.
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1INTRODUCTION
Many farmers are currently facing severe financial stress result­
ing in asset liquidations, problems in obtaining credit, and even bank­
ruptcy. An important question in policy analysis is the applicability 
of traditional farm policy approaches to the problem of financial 
stress in agriculture. This is a particularly relevant question given 
that the 1983 PIK program was one of the most expensive and largest 
government transfer programs for agriculture in recent history, and yet 
many farmers are still facing severe financial problems. In this dis­
cussion the causes of current financial stress in agriculture and the 
role of past price and income support, credit and tax policies in miti­
gating or contributing to this stress will be assessed. Then alterna­
tive policy options to relieve the stress will be identified and evalu­
ated* Finally, conclusions will be drawn.
FINANCIAL STRESS: EXISTENCE AND CAUSES
Existence
Melichar [January, 1984] has documented the financial condition of 
the agricultural sector; that data will not be repeated In detail here. 
A key dimension of this documentation is the distribution of debt 
(Table 1). This distribution indicates that approximately 58 percent 
of the farms in the United States have leverage ratios of 10 percent or
2less, 24 percent have ratios from 11-40 percent, 11 percent have ratios 
of 41-70 percent and eight percent have leverage ratios in excess of 70 
percent* This highly leveraged category (greater than 70 percent) con­
trol 31 percent of the debt and eight percent of the assets in U.S. 
agriculture. With current price, cost, and productivity relationships 
in agriculture, these highly leveraged farms are unable to make inter­
est payments on their indebtedness, let alone repay any principal. In 
fact, Melichar's calculations suggest that farms with debt-to-asset 
ratios exceeding 30 percent will likely encounter some financial stress 
at current interest rates and rates of return on assets.
Survey data from individual Iowa farms corroborates Melichar’s re­
sults and implications [Jolly, 1984]. Of the 1,231 farmers surveyed,
31 percent had no real estate or nonreal estate debt and exhibited 
debt-to-asset ratios averaging 1.8 percent; these farmers are not fi­
nancially stressed by the current economic conditions in agriculture.
In contrast, 40 percent of the farmers have both real estate and non- 
real estate debt and a debt-to-asset ratio averaging 41.7 percent. Of 
those with real estate loans (57 percent of the sample), 90 percent 
were current on interest and principal payments, 3.7 percent were cur­
rent on interest payments only, and 6.3 percent were delinquent on both 
principal and interest payments. For those with operating loans (51 
percent of the sample), 73 percent were current on principal and inter­
est payments, 18 percent were current on interest only, and 9 percent 
were delinquent on principal and interest.
3Table 2 Indicates the distribution of operators, assets, and lia­
bilities for the Iowa sample by debt-to-asset category; the distribu­
tional results are very similar to those in Table 1 from Melichar's 
work. Size classification of the data (Table 3) suggests that finan­
cial stress problems are not unique to a particular size firm— firms of 
all sizes are encountering such stress.
financial management strategies and enhanced farm and off-farm in­
come can be used to relieve the stress for many farms, but those with 
higher leverage ratios (for example, 70 percent or greater) will likely 
not be able to obtain sufficient relief from various financial and farm 
management strategies to stave off asset liquidation or default. In 
essence, at least 8-10 percent of U.S. farm assets must find a new 
owner in the next year or so, or the debt secured by those assets will 
not be serviced. Even those with debt-to-asset ratios of 40-70 percent 
will experience declining equity (even if land values stabilize) unless 
commodity prices rise, interest rates and other input prices fall, or 
productivity increases. In essence, the financial stress is signifi­
cant for a subset of the farm population.
Causes
To evaluate the relevance of public policy and, in particular, 
traditional farm income and price support programs, to the current fi­
nancial problems in agriculture, it is important to understand the 
broader dimensions of today1s "farm problem." Clearly, farm incomes
4are lower than they were during a large part of the 1970s, but similar 
income levels were encountered in prior years without the severity of 
the financial pressures currently being felt. In fact, there are six 
additional characteristics of the current financial stress in agricul­
ture, and some of them will be only indirectly impacted by price and 
income support programs.
In addition to lower incomes, farmers have a much higher debt-to- 
income ratio than in prior years. Based on USDA data, aggregate debt 
of the U.S. agricultural sector was approximately 90 percent of net 
farm income in 1950, resulting in a debt to income ratio of less than 
one. This ratio rose to two in 1960, to approximately three in 1970, 
and now stands in excess of ten to one [Economic Indicators of the Farm 
Sector: Income and Balance Sheet Statistics, 1982].^ Although non-
farm income of farmers has increased in relative importance in recent 
years, this income is concentrated on smaller farms that have lower 
debt loads, so does not significantly improve the debt carrying capac­
ity of those farmers with the majority of the debt [Melichar, November 
1984]. Thus, farmers are attempting to carry a much larger debt load 
per dollar of debt servicing capacity (i.e., income) which adds to
^Melichar has recalculated this ratio for 1983 by adjusting 
total income and debt by an estimate of the amount attriutable to land­
lords [Melichar, November 1984], The result is a lower debt to income 
ratio in 1983 than that obtained with unadjusted data. However, simi­
lar adjustments must be made in earlier years to obtain comparable 
data, suggesting that the trend of a significantly rising debt to in­
come ratio over time still occurs.
5their financial pressure# In fact, to obtain a debt—to—income ratio 
representative of the mid-1970s would require incomes to more than 
triple, not a realistic possibility in the near future# Furthermore, 
the maturity structure on debt has shortened; farmers with lower in­
comes and higher debt loads are being required to repay that debt more 
rapidly. Institutional lenders such as banks and PCAs have shortened 
maturities to reduce their interest rate risk exposure. Although Fed­
eral Land Banks and other long-term institutional lenders have not ad­
justed terms significantly, land contracts, which comprise a substan­
tial portion of farm real estate debt, have become shorter in maturity 
in recent years.
Another balance sheet adjustment which has occurred on many farms 
is that of reduced liquidity. In 1950 approximately 27 percent of the 
asset base on the typical farm firm was liquid (i.e., financial assets 
or crop and livestock inventories); in 1980 only 11 percent was liquid 
[Economic Indicators of the Farm Sector: Income and Balance Sheet Sta­
tistics, 1982]*^ In the past, liquidity provided a safety valve for 
that farmer who did not generate sufficient income to meet the debt 
servicing requirement; he or she could sell part of the liquid asset 
base without sacrificing part of the productive plant-— the land,
^Melichar has argued that the USDA Balance Sheet of Agriculture 
significantly understates financial assets in the agricultural sector, 
but even with his adjustments the proportion of total assets that were 
liquid (financial assets plus crop and livestock inventories) in 1980 
is not altered substantially [Melichar, 1983].
6machinery or breeding stock. Today, liquidity is gone-— forcing some 
farmers to consider selling part of the fixed asset base to service 
the ir indeb t edne s s.
In reality, farmers dramatically restructured their balance sheets 
during the 1970s, increasing the amount of fixed assets compared to in­
ventories and other assets easily converted to cash in times of finan­
cial stress; and increasing the amount of current liabilities compared 
to longer term obligations, thus adding to the current debt servicing 
requirements. Improved farm incomes will help reduce the financial 
stress in agriculture, but will only eliminate this mismatching of 
assets and liabilities if farmers use the additional income to either 
pay down debt or increase liquidity rather than purchase fixed assets. 
Even if farmers use their improved incomes to restructure their balance 
sheets, the process will be slow— thus suggesting that financial stress 
will be a long-run problem for the agricultural sector.
An additional characteristic of the current financial stress in 
agriculture is the increased income and collateral risk faced by most 
farmers. A significant change in government policy in the 1980s re­
sulted in a reduced safety net for agriculture and a movement to grad­
ually transfer the responsibility for managing risk from the government 
to the individual farmer. This change in philosophy is reflected in 
the substitution of crop insurance for disaster programs, the changing 
role of the Farmers Home Administration, and the approach to government 
farm programs that provides incentives for participation but is not
7structured to necessarily benefit those who do not participate and pay 
the "insurance premium." Although the income risk in agriculture may 
not be significantly larger this decade than last, the responsibility 
for managing that risk is being transferred from the public to the pri­
vate sector. Some farmers still have not accepted this concept.
In addition to income risk, farmers are now facing collateral risk 
as well. During the three decades from 1950 to 1980, even when farm 
incomes turned down, the lending community was willing to extend credit 
to the agricultural sector because collateral values (specifically land 
values) were stable or rising. A key reason lenders have turned con­
servative during the last four years is that in addition to income 
risk, they are facing reduced collateral values and deteriorating se­
curity positions. Legitimately so, the borrower who has financial los­
ses combined with declining collateral is perceived to be less credit­
worthy than one who has financial losses but stable or rising collat­
eral values.
A further consequence of declining collateral values is that the 
traditional safety valve of the 1970s for farmers who could not meet 
the cash flow— that of refinancing— is either no longer available, or 
is quite costly because of higher interest rates. In reality, the 
agricultural sector no longer has a financial safety valve; adjustments 
on the liability side of the balance sheet to reduce financial pressure 
by extending the terms on the debt are no longer possible for many 
operators, and liquidity is nonexistent in many cases. Thus, a signif-
8leant number of farmers are having to consider asset liquidations as a 
means of reducing or eliminating the financial pressures they are fac­
ing.
A seventh characteristic of today’s financial stress in agricul­
ture is that of higher and more volatile interest rates [Melichar, 
January, 1984]* When queried as to what is the fundamental reason why 
they have encountered financial difficulties, many farmers respond that 
they did not anticipate the dramatic rise in Interest rates that 
occurred from the mid-1970s to 1980. A shift from relatively low real 
and nominal interest rates to relatively high rates is particularly 
devastating for an industry like agriculture that has a large propor­
tion of its total debt used to finance fixed assets on a variable rate„ 
In other industries with a larger proportion of the debt used in inven­
tory financing, it is easier to adjust debt utilization to rising 
interest rates• Because of the dominance of fixed assets in the asset 
base of the agricultural sector, and the necessity to finance those 
fixed assets with longer term financial obligations, it has been much 
more difficult for the farm sector to adjust to rising rates than other 
sectors of our economy•
IMPACT OF PAST POLICIES
A fundamental question in evaluating the future direction of agri­
cultural and economic policies is whether or not past policies have
9contributed to the financial stress of agriculture; if so one should be 
careful that such policies are not continued or repeated. The three 
areas of policy that merit evaluation in answering this question are 
price and income support policy, federal credit and interest rate pol­
icy , and tax policy.
Price and income support policy
In recent years, government support prices for agricultural com­
modities have been formally or informally indexed to the cost of pro- 
duction— as costs of production (variously defined) rose, support 
prices rose. In terms of financial stress, the issue is how have such 
indexed support prices affected price expectations of producers, re­
source values, and debt-carrying and debt-servicing capacity.
Analysis of the impact of government price and income support pro­
grams on asset values, particularly land, indicates that such programs 
have put upward pressure on prices. Hedrick [1962] documented that 
peanut price support and allotment program benefits have been capital­
ized into land values. Similar analyses have been completed by Boxley 
and Gibson [1964] and Boxley and Anderson [1973] for peanuts and to­
bacco, respectively. A more recent study by Reynolds and Timmons 
[1969] confirms that government farm program payments have resulted in 
higher land values In the Midwest as well.
However, the cost-of-production approach to specifying support 
prices provides a much more direct linkage between government pro­
10
grains and land values than previous policies. Using an income capital­
ization model* Boehlje and Griffin [1979] indicate that cost of produc­
tion indexed price supports not only increase the expected income * thus 
generating higher land values* but they also truncate the left tail of 
the price distribution, thus decreasing the price risk and the capital­
ization rate which results in further upward pressure on land values. 
Furthermore, the guaranteed cash flow of such a support price system 
increases the debt carrying capacity of the firm. These results 
strongly support the argument that government farm programs of the past 
decade have increased the guaranteed cash flow of the farm business and 
reduced the financial risk, resulting in increased bid prices for dur­
able assets such as land, increased debt-carrying capacity and thus fi­
nancial leverage, and a more rapid rate of growth of the farm. Thus, 
such programs have contributed to the financial stress in agriculture.
Credit and interest rate policy
Public sector lending to farm firms has been a reality for many 
years, but with the recent economic and financial stress in agricul­
ture, pressures have developed for larger public sector lending pro­
grams for farmers. However, various analysts have suggested that part 
of the current financial stress of some farmers can be attributed to 
indiscriminate public sector lending in the past, and that additional 
credit will do little to relieve the financial stress for those farmers 
who are already highly leveraged.
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To most people, public credit in agriculture means the Farmers 
Home Administration (FmHA). The FmHA program has undergone dramatic 
changes in recent years. In 1960, FmHA administered eight programs of 
which farm operating loans accounted for 64 percent and farm ownership 
loans accounted for 14 percent of loan volume. By 1982, FmHA operated 
23 grant and loan programs, with farm operating loans accounting for 
15 percent and farm ownership loans accounting for eight percent of 
loan volume [Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
1984]. Emergency disaster, economic emergency, individual housing, 
rural rental housing, water and waste loans and grants, and business 
and industrial development loans each accounted for larger shares of 
FmHA activity in recent years.
This does not necessarily mean that FmHA has neglected its tradi­
tional role. The absolute level (as opposed to percentage share) of 
farm operating and farm ownership loans has been at a record high in 
recent years. What the current situation does indicate is that the 
FmHA has become a giant, many-faceted agency that perhaps has been ab­
sorbing programs and mandates (many unrequested) faster than it can 
maintain a clear sense of purpose and direction. More than $8 billion 
in loan and grant obligations were made by FmHA in 1982, a decrease 
from the high of nearly $14 billion in 1979 and 10 times the amount of 
1962 [Lee, Gabriel, and Boehlje, 1980].
Who is served by FmHA's farmer oriented programs? By design, the 
agency is a lender of last resort; that is, its borrowers are supposed
12
to be those unable to obtain funding elsewhere* A recent study of bor­
rower characteristics suggests that in 1979 the farm operating and farm 
ownership loans were heavily directed to young farmers and those with 
small net worth and low incomes [Lee, Gabriel, and Boehlje, 1980]*
Over 68 percent of the money loaned in the farm ownership program that 
year went to farmers with less than $12,000 in net cash income and less 
than $120,000 in net worth* Over 74 percent of farm operating loan 
money went to farmers in the same category. In the same year, 50 per­
cent of the money loaned in each of these programs went to people under 
the age of 30.
However, the economic emergency loans were distributed a bit dif­
ferently. The borrowers tended to have low income (presumably, that is 
what put them in an "emergency" situation), but over a third of the 
money loaned in 1979 went to farmers with more than half a million dol­
lars in assets. Farms with gross value of sales of over $40,000 repre­
sented one-fifth of all farms, but received more than two-thirds of the 
money loaned under the Economic Emergency Program in 1979.
The FmHA share of total farm debt has grown rapidly in recent 
years with FmHA holding 15 percent of the nonreal estate farm debt in 
1984. Regionally, the Southeastern states are much more dependent upon 
FmHA debt than other regions of the United States. This rapid growth 
in volume, combined with the current economic stress, has resulted in 
severe repayment problems on the part of FmHA farm borrowers. A total 
of 24.6 percent of all farm program borrowers were delinquent at fiscal
13
year-end 1982; 31 percent of active farm program borrowers totaling 
approximately 84,000 clients had missed their scheduled payments as of 
July 31, 1983 [Farmer Home Administration, 1984], These delinquency 
rates are clear cause for alarm as to the viability of FmHA farm lend­
ing programs* A fundamental issue is whether such high delinquency 
rates are a function of inadequate procedures in loan extension and 
supervision, or whether such performance is "normal" in times of eco­
nomic stress. Irrespective of the answer, extension of significant 
amounts of credit (much of it at subsidized rates) by FmHA has contrib­
uted to the high debt load in agriculture.
Providing public credit through FmHA or other agencies to preserve 
the normally healthy, moderate-size farm temporarily caught in adverse 
conditions could be consistent with the long-term goals of agricultural 
policy. Present trends suggest that about two—thirds of the land sold 
each year is bought by farmers and consolidated into existing farm 
units. This is the primary source of increasing concentration in the 
farm sector. If the normally-healthy-but-temporarily-in-trouble farms 
are allowed to go out of business, it is reasonable to assume that some 
portion of them will be consolidated into other existing units. Thus, 
assuring that such farms obtain the funds needed to stay viable would 
be consistent with the goals of efficiency, preserving a pluralistic 
agriculture for resiliency and future flexibility, providing economic 
opportunity for more people, and ultimately assuring food security.
But there are some risks to the public sector* This problem can be
14
minimized by reducing the subsidy as much as possible, thus reducing 
the attractiveness of the emergency credit.
If, instead of a moderate-size family farm, the farm in temporary 
trouble is very large, it is not clear that the same arguments for pub­
lic credit assistance hold* If the farm was much larger than necessary 
to achieve efficiency, and if the odds favored some or all of the land 
being sold In smaller tracts to new farmers or moderate-sized existing 
farmers, there would be no particular public interest in saving the 
larger farm*
There would appear to be no direct economic reason for offering 
subsidized public credit to preserve those farms that are subraarginal 
even under normal economic conditions and for whom that does not appear 
to be a temporary phenomenon. Both the subsidy in the credit program 
and the inefficient use of resources implied by the farm being submar­
ginal are social costs. However, perhaps one more question should be 
asked: Is the social cost ultimately greater if the farmer goes out of
business? This is not likely if there is alternative gainful employ­
ment. But if the displaced farmers or workers end up as a public lia­
bility anyway, social costs may be minimized by extension of public 
credit to keep them in business, at least until better opportunities 
are available.
The same general comments apply to the farmers in trouble because 
of natural disasters. That is, it would be consistent with goals of 
efficiency, competitiveness, and future flexibility to provide public
15
credit assistance to efficient-size family farms. For larger farms the 
question is how far the public should go in sharing the risks and pro­
tecting the interests of the wealthy.
For a third group, those who need specialized help or terms, the 
appropriateness of public credit assistance depends on the likelihood 
that the operator will successfully graduate to private credit and 
eventually repay the public investment through taxes; on efficient use 
of resources; and on contribution to pluralism in the farm sector. It 
is in these programs, more than any other, that social objectives and 
economic objectives of credit policy come face to face.
Little need be said about the impact of interest rate policy on 
agriculture. Stimulative fiscal policy and tight monetary policy com­
bined with deregulation of interest rates and implementation of mone­
tary policy by controlling the money supply rather than pegging inter­
est rates has resulted in higher and more volatile costs of money for 
farmers. We have moved from an extended period of low and predictable 
real rates of interest to high and volatile rates, and because of the 
fixed asset based in agriculture and the long-term financing needs, 
farmers have not been able to adjust borrowing levels to the higher 
rates. In fact, some would argue that government fiscal and monetary 
policy as it impacts interest rates is the major contributor to finan­
cial stress in agriculture, and that policies that will lower interest 
rates are more important to the long run financial health of agricul­
16
tural than credit or price and income support policy. This argument 
will be evaluated further later in this discussion.
Tax policy
Numerous studies have shown that taxes and tax management play a 
significant role in the choice among various production, marketing, 
and financial strategies by farmers. These studies also indicate that 
tax policy has influenced purchasing patterns for capital assets and 
exerted upward pressure on farm asset prices, particularly farmland 
[Davenport, et al* 1982]. This pressure comes about because land pro­
vides an ideal tax shelter. The return obtained from appreciation or 
increases in land value is not taxed until the property is sold. And 
if the land is held until death, this return is exempted. Carrying 
costs in the form of interest are fully deductible and may offset in­
come from other sources. In essence, income taxed at low rates, or 
perhaps even exempt from tax, is combined with fully deductible costs-—  
the classic tax shelter. Furthermore, farmland under the Tax Reform 
Act of 1976 has become an estate tax shelter as well as an income tax 
shelter.
At the same time, the provisions of both the income and estate tax 
law contain futures that tend to restrict the supply of land offered 
for sale. In the case of the income tax, the exemption from tax of 
gains on property that passes at death encourages the holding of land 
until death. In regard to estate tax, the ownership requirements that
17
must be met to qualify for the estate tax preferences discourage sales 
both before and after death. The greater demand for land and the re­
striction of its supply have operated to keep upward pressure on prices 
of farmland.
Tax laws appear to have also encouraged the growth of individual 
farm firms. The use of cash accounting allows farming to be a tax 
sheltered industry. So long as there is other income that would be 
subject to tax except for the tax shelter, taxpayers in a higher tax 
bracket have more funds for growth and expansion than they would if the 
tax sheltered asset did not exist. Furthermore, however great is the 
advantage of cash accounting, it is augmented if some of the income 
produced through deductions can be reported as capital gain which is 
taxed at lower, preferential rates. Investment tax credit provisions, 
accelerated depreciation, and the tax deductibility of interest have 
also encouraged firm expansion and the substitution of capital for 
labor. By encouraging growth of the firm, increased use of debt, the 
substitution of capital for labor, and higher land prices, tax policy 
has contributed to the current financial stress in agriculture.
POLICY OPTIONS
Given the financial stress faced by the agricultural sector, a 
relevant question is what should be the appropriate policy response?
The agricultural sector is facing a new financial and economic environ­
ment, and adjusting to that environment may require government assist­
18
ance to make sure that the process of adjustment is not too costly in 
terms of financial and human losses• However, most analysts believe 
that in the intermediate-term agriculture must also adjust to excess 
production capacity and lower values for some agricultural resources, 
particularly land. If this is the case, then a public policy that im­
pedes that adjustment will not only be very costly, but may result in 
long-term dependence on government assistance as well as continued gov­
ernment interference. What kind of policy response is targeted to the 
problems of financial stress, is politically acceptable in an environ­
ment of fiscal restraint, and does not impede the long-term adjustments 
that are necessary to maintain a productive, efficient, and financially 
healthy agriculture.
Much of the past debate concerning the public response to assist 
farmers in financial stress has focused on the traditional approach to 
agricultural policy— various forms of price and income supports. How­
ever, when one views the current financial crisis in agriculture in the 
broader prospective suggested earlier, it is clear that farm income and 
price support policy will not alone solve the "problem." An income 
oriented policy, a policy that focuses on price and income supports 
alone, will have fairly minor impacts on financial stress. Further­
more , such a policy may not only be an extremely high cost alternative, 
but if improperly implemented might result in disincentives to adjust 
the resource use in agriculture to the slower growth in demand for its 
products. We do need to have improved incomes for a healthy agricul­
19
tural sector, but the financial stress problem in agriculture is much 
more complex. In fact, an income policy focusing on surpluses and sup­
ply control may not only miss the target from a prospective of the 
problem, but because most of the support will go to larger farms, 
whereas farms of all sizes are exhibiting financial stress, such a pro­
gram may miss the target audience as well. Other means for enhancing 
the income of agriculture through subsidizing and promoting exports, 
devaluing the dollar, expanding domestic consumption including bio-mass 
production and fuel use, and converting grainland to grassland also 
have similar problems— -they only focus on one dimension of today1s 
financial crisis in agriculture. A broader set of policies and a 
broader perspective of the problem is essential to develop an adequate 
solution to today’s ’’farm problem."
Public policy currently does encumber a set of rules to receive 
severe financial stress problems— the bankruptcy rules. Although bank­
ruptcy may involve immediate liquidation of the assets and a discharge 
of the indebtedness of the farm [Chap. 7 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, 
Public Law No. 95-593, 92 Stat. 2549, 1978], it can also involve re­
structuring and rehabilitating the business under Chapter 11 or 13 of 
the bankruptcy law. Farmers can not be forced into an involuntary bank­
ruptcy. A farmer who chooses Chapter 11 (or possibly Chapter 13) bank­
ruptcy proceedings becomes a "debtor in possession"— generally the 
farmer continues to manage and operate the farm, possibly under the 
surveillance of a creditor's committee [Looney, 1980]. A trustee to
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manage the property is appointed only in rare cases, so the farmer can 
continue to operate the farm as long as he develops an acceptable debt 
reduction plan.
The bankruptcy rules specify how the private sector will share fi­
nancial losses in case of a default by a creditor, but two fundamental 
issues remain* First, should the private sector— the creditor, the 
debtor, and others who have or are doing business with the debtor ab­
sorb the full loss, or should the public sector share in part of this 
loss through souk type of government transfer payment program? And 
second, and probably most important, is the question concerning who in 
the private sector under the current provisions will typically be re­
quired to absorb the majority of the loss? Because of the extensive 
use of merchant and dealer credit in agriculture provided by input sup­
ply firms who are usually unsecured creditors, the bankruptcy rules 
will likely transfer the major losses from the production sector and 
the lending institutions to the input supply firms. In many cases the 
financial losses will be transferred from those who have been directly 
involved in the financial management and debt utilization decisions 
(i.e., the producer and his lending institution) to those who have only 
been peripherally involved in those decisions (i*e•, the input supply 
firm and other unsecured creditors including many landlords). A fun­
damental question can be raised as to the equitability of this sharing 
of the financial losses due to debtor default*
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A second rather blunt policy instrument that might be used to re­
spond to the current financial stress in agriculture is a debt morator­
ium* This alternative would deny the use of foreclosure procedures 
against farmers who cannot make their principal and interest payments, 
cancel or defer interest and principal payments for a time specific, 
write down a portion or all of the indebtedness, deny deficiency judg­
ments for those who cannot make their payments, or various combinations 
of the above. The purpose of such a policy response would be to enable 
the financially pressed producer to temporarily be relieved of the fi­
nancial obligations associated with excessive debt. Most debt morator­
ium proposals include a temporary, time limited period where debt obli­
gations need not be met, but they do not eliminte the eventual and def­
inite commitment to repay indebtedness. Consequently, a key to the 
success of such proposals is the assumption that the financial condi­
tion of the firm and the industry will improve sufficiently in the 
intervening period so that the obligations can be repaid. Debt mora­
toriums have been used with limited success in previous periods of 
financial stress, specifically the 1930s, to relieve the financial 
pressure faced by farmers.
The major direct cost of a debt moratorium is the income foregone 
by the lenders during the moratorium period. But in addition to this 
cost, there is serious concern about the implications of such programs 
on the long-run performance of the financial markets. The implementa­
tion of a debt moratorium would likely result in the lending institu­
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tions concluding that such a prospect has a higher probability in fu­
ture periods of financial stress* Consequently, lenders who feel their 
earnings flow may be interrupted by future moratoria will likely judge 
that there is more financial risk in credit extension and would expect 
to be compensated for that risk through higher rates of interest. Fur­
thermore, some borrowers would no longer be able to obtain credit even 
if they have adequate collateral because a debt moratorium has negated 
the value of collateral in the credit extension decision. In essence, 
the use of this particular alternative would likely result in chaotic 
conditions in the financial markets, higher Interest rates for the 
agricultural sector, and the definite prospect that many firms would no 
longer be able to obtain credit.
Another possible public policy response is the provision of loan 
guarantees from a federal or state agency to Indemnify the lending 
institution from potential default on the part of a borrower. The pro­
vision of a government loan guarantee would reduce the risk faced by 
the lender, thus encouraging forbearance and loan, restructuring. A 
loan guarantee might be conditional upon an approved plan of liquida­
tion or other more permanent solutions. Such a program is currently 
available from the Farmer's Home Administration; additional funding 
could be made available for this program which would eliminate the need 
for unique legislation.
To be a permanent and effective solution, a loan guarantee program 
must be combined with other alternatives such as systematic asset or
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liability restructuring to reduce the debt obligation or increase the 
cash flow of the business. Properly structured, a loan guarantee pro­
gram may provide the time necessary to implement other more permanent 
solutions and protect the resource markets from collapsing in the proc­
ess, Without such a long-term solution, a loan guarantee program might 
be perceived as simply a 11 lender bailout, A variation of the loan 
guarantee program is to offer the lender a federal or state bond in ex­
change for the loan; such a program transfers the responsibility for 
collection as well as the debt obligation to the government and quite 
likely would result in higher cost than the traditional Farmer's Home 
Administration, SBA, or other government guarantee,
A proposal which has received wide-spread attention recently is 
that of federally assisted debt restructuring# In fact most of the 
current legislative proposals are variations of the debt restructuring 
theme. The premise of this approach is that providing additional time 
to repay the principal would reduce annual obligations, thus enabling 
some farmers to cover these lower principal and interest payments# And 
for those who still cannot meet their debt obligations, restructuring 
would give them some additional time to rearrange the financial struc­
ture of their business including possibly the sale of assets. Most re­
structuring proposals involve the potential of a write-down of the debt 
obligation as a condition to obtain a federal or state guarantee [Harl, 
May, 1984], The key concept is to provide a government incentive for 
the private sector to implement workout plans and to "buy time' so that
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these plans can be implemented rather than forcing the sale of assets 
and collapsing the resource markets# For many producers who are facing 
financial stress, such a program again may not be a permanent solution, 
but the first step in a longer-run plan to adjust the asset and liabil­
ity structure of the business so that the firm can survive.
As noted earlier, one of the severe problems faced by agriculture 
has been higher interest rates# Consequently, various proposed policy 
responses include interest rate buy-downs or subsidies which are 
focused at reducing this component of the cost structure for farmers# 
Interest rate buy-downs can be implemented in many ways including a di­
rect government subsidy of interest rates for farmers, an increased tax 
write-off for farm interest payments, a public guarantee to reduce the 
risk faced by the lender and therefore allow him (her) to charge a 
lower interest rate to the borrower, and the use of tax exempt revenue 
bonds to obtain lower cost funds for agriculture# Temporary interest 
rate reductions would benefit farmers in the short-run, because inter­
est has become a major component of the cost of production, particu­
larly for those who are highly leveraged. However, a better alterna­
tive than interest rate buy-downs for agriculture would be responsible 
monetary and fiscal policy that reduces the size of the government def­
icit and the demands of the federal government on the capital markets. 
Such policy would result in lower market rates of interest throughout 
the U.S# economy, which would have similar benefits to farmers as an 
interest rate buy-down plan in terms of reducing their cost of produc­
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tion. Furthermore, lower interest rates in general would have a sig­
nificant impact on the demand for agricultural commodities by making 
U. S. investments less attractive to foreign investors, thus reducing 
the demand for the dollar which would result in lower exchange rates 
and increased export demand for agricultural commodities* The conse­
quences of interest rate buy-down alternatives will be quantitatively 
assessed in a later section of this paper•
As suggested earlier, debt restructuring may not be adequate for 
some producers and asset restructuring including liquidation may be re­
quired to improve the chances of survivability of the firm. Much of 
the current asset restructuring involves liquidation of real estate and 
other capital items for cash, but there is only so much liquidity in 
rural communities, and cash liquidations frequently result in substan­
tial liquidation losses. Other means of liquidation must be investi­
gated and could be facilitated by public policy. For example, lending 
institutions might be encouraged to take the title of real property in 
lieu of debt obligations, and then lease this property back to the 
original debtor. Such an arrangement would keep the property off the 
market and thus reduce the chance of resource markets being depressed 
further. In addition, by leasing the property back to the original 
operator, other resources such as machinery and equipment could be 
efficiently utilized rather than also being in excess. The lender 
through this process can convert a nonperforming asset into one that 
generates at least some rate of return in the form of rental payments.
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To reduce the possibility that the lender must tie up its liquidity in 
such assets, a government program of providing funds to the lender in 
the amount of the assets taken back in lieu of debt could be imple­
mented. In fact, government funds could be provided to the institution 
at a cost which would typically be lower than the cost of funds from 
the private sector, which would thus partly off-set the lower yield be­
ing earned by the asset. Such a program might require the lender to 
remove the assets from its portfolio over a two or three-year period 
with the original debtor having a first option to buy. A similar pro­
gram might be implemented by a state agency or a newly formed private 
sector firm funded through state or federal revenue bonds.
Again, one of the purposes of such a program is to stabilize re­
source values. A critical issue today is whether the public sector 
should play a role in asset liquidations in the form of regulating, 
monitoring or facilitating the process. Legitimate concerns have been 
expressed about the attitudes of some lenders who are encouraging cash 
sales of assets without recognition of the implications for the pro­
ducer or the asset markets. Collateral values are declining in part 
because of forced sales of assets for cash into a market where there is 
no cash. We need to be much more innovative in the liquidation proc­
ess, and we need to evaluate whether there is something that should be 
done in the public policy arena to assist in this financial stress en­
vironment
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A final alternative that might involve public policy is that of 
recapitalization. In many cases, the financial structure of the busi­
ness could be significantly improved through an infusion of equity from 
outside the firm, either by a debt holder exchanging his obligation for 
an equity position in the firm, or an outside investor providing addi­
tional funds which are used to reduce indebtedness. An equity infusion 
may at first glance appear to be difficult to orchestrate. Who would 
want to put equity into a financially troubled firm? In some cases 
family members may be willing to provide such an infusion to protect 
the integrity of a family business. An expected future inheritance of 
nonbusiness assets could be converted into current cash through sale to 
other family members, A nonfamily investor might be willing to con­
tribute capital for a larger-than-proportionate share of the ownership 
of the firm. Some investors may be attracted by the tax shelter avail­
able from operating losses; under certain conditions, an operating loss 
is, in reality, an asset for a high tax bracket investor. And unused 
tax credits may be available to make the equity infusion more attrac­
tive for the investor.
The third source of an equity infusion is the lender. In some 
cases, the financial condition of the firm is such that the lender will 
incur a significant loss if the note is called, foreclosure occurs, or 
the operator takes advantage of the bankruptcy procedures. If the firm 
has current cash flow problems because of high leverage and aggressive 
growth, but strong management and the potential for reasonable future
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earnings, the lender may minimize losses or increase the chances for 
recovery by converting debt obligations into equity. This conversion 
reduces the current cash flow burden of excessive debt servicing and 
releases resources (both funds and management) to use in more produc­
tive activities that will enhance current and future income.
The role of public policy in this area of outside equity infusions 
or recapitalization may be one of reassessing current legislation which 
discourages such arrangements. Many states have passed laws that re­
strict or prohibit outside equity investments in agriculture. Such 
prohibitions or restrictions should be reassessed in the current finan­
cial stress environment. Alternatively, a government financed venture 
capital entity might be formed to make the necessary equity capital in­
fusion into agriculture under terms that are more acceptable to both 
farmer and investor. Such an arrangement could be financed with state 
revenue bonds or federal funding. An institution not all that dissimi­
lar from Agricultural Development Banks used in many Third World coun­
tries which involves a combination of public and private sector 
funding might be a viable institutional innovation in the U.S. capital 
markets at the present time.
A final role of public policy in the current environment would be 
one of providing information to facilitate the adjustment process. 
Programs to facilitate the merger of business firms, to retrain and re­
locate people, and to disseminate the best information on adjustment 
strategies and resource availability might make the adjustments less
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painful for those involved. However, it is not clear that such pro­
grams would he an adequate response to the current financial stress 
problem in agriculture.
CONCLUSIONS
Data from Iowa and other states along with that from the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture indicate that a significant number of farm­
ers are suffering financial stress. This stress is a result of the 
many changes in the financial environment for agriculture, and is not 
simply a result of lower incomes• Other factors that contribute to the 
financial stress problem of the U.S. agricultural sector are a higher 
debt load, shorter maturities on debt, reduced liquidity, higher and 
more volatile interest rates, increased income and collateral risk, 
limited availability of refinancing alternatives, and asset liquida­
tions. Government policies of the past have contributed to today's fi­
nancial stress by encouraging higher land values, more debt utiliza­
tion, growth in farm size, and higher interest rates.
Given the complex nature of the financial stress problem, a public 
policy approach that focuses only on one characteristic of that problem 
will probably be ineffective. Specifically, price and income support 
programs which have been the major component of agricultural policy in 
the past may be quite ineffective in solving the current financial 
stress problem-— such programs do not focus on some of the major dimen­
sions of the stress problem (i.e. loan maturities, liquidity, collat­
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eral risk, etc,), and furthermore quite likely will not be targeted to 
those individuals who have financial stress. Such programs may in fact 
compound and contribute to the longer run financial problems in agri­
culture.
Various policy options that are more targeted to the financial 
stress problem have been identified including interest rate buy-downs, 
debt moratoriums, debt restructuring, bankruptcy, asset restructuring, 
recapitalization, etc. While spiraling farm debt suggests that debt 
restructuring is the answer to the current financial stress, a restruc­
turing of agricultural assets remains the key to a long-term solution. 
The rearranging of liabilities is not a permanent solution to the cur­
rent financial stress, because even with more time to repay, many farm­
ers will not be able to service their debt with current or expected 
interest rates, productivity, and input and commodity prices. However, 
debt restructuring is an important mechanism for buying time to imple­
ment more permanent solutions. Asset restructuring, including liquida­
tion, debt reductions, and equity infusions will be required to improve 
the chances of long-term survivability of many farm businesses.
One of the key objectives of any public policy to alleviate finan­
cial stress should be to protect the resource markets from collapsing—  
stabilizing resource values is critical to maintaining the stability of 
the agricultural production sector and rural communities. If resource 
values decline precipitously because of excessive supplies being 
offered to a market that has no liquidity to absorb them, many farmers
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who were a "good credit risk" will no longer be so because of declining 
collateral values. But using government intervention to stabilize re­
source values at levels that are not supportable in the long-run by 
market prices can result in very high government costs, inefficient re­
source allocation, and higher consumer prices for food products. Such 
a result is also clearly not desirable.
The agricultural sector has suffered significant wealth losses 
during the recent years. An important public policy concern is how 
those losses will be shared among the various firms in the private sec- 
tor (farmers, lenders, input supply firms, landlords, etc.) and between 
the public sector and the private sector. A related concern is how to 
keep the losses from becoming more severe than they need be. What may 
be needed is a public sector contingency plan that can provide a safety 
net in case the farm economy continues to be stagnate and/or the re­
source markets began to collapse. A strategy of doing nothing today 
could, if the financial condition of agriculture continues to deterio­
rate, very easily result in irresistable political and economic pres­
sures to implement drastic options later such as a general and extended 
debt moratorium or significant increases in commodity support prices. 
But inappropriate action now may interfere with the longer-run adjust­
ments In resource values and utilization that must occur to retain an
efficient and financially sound agricultural sector.
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Table 1# U«S. Farms; Debts and Assets by Leverage
Debt to Asset Ratio (percent)
0-10 11-40 41-70 71+ Total (%)
Operators (%) 58 24 11 8 100
Debt (%) 5 32 32 31 100
Assets (%) 47 32 14 8 100
Source: Melichar Jan. 84 Federal Reserve Bulletin.
Table 2. Estimated Percentage Distributions of Sample Farm Operate 
Their Assets and Liabilities by Relative Debt Levels
Debt-to-Asset Ratios
0-10 11™40 41-70 71+
Percent operators 36 35 18 10
Percent Assets 30 40 21 9
Percent Liabilities 3 32 40 25
Source: Farm Finance Survey? March 1984, Iowa Departmet of
Agriculture.
^Totals may not equal 100 due to rounding errors.
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Table 3. Estimated Percentage Distributions of Iowa Farm Operators, Their Debt
and Assets by Farm Size and Debt Level Categories
Debt-to-Asset Ratio (%)
0-10 11-40 41-70 #71
Farm Size **
Number in Sample 13 7 7 5
Very small X Operators 41 22 22 16
7o Assets 39 25 25 11
% Debt 0 25 41 34
— _____ — — - ------ — --- ---- ------
Number in Sample 61 45 25 17
Small % Operators 41 30 17 11
% Assets 41 31 18 11
% Debt 3 25 33 38
Number in Sample 211 199 95 58
Medium % Operators 37 35 17 10
% Assets 34 37 18 11
X Debt 3 31 35 31
Number in Sample 29 55 33 6
Large % Operators 24 45 27 5
% Assets 24 45 26 5
% Debt 4 35 47 14
______— — — — —— — — *— — ___---- - — -*--
Number in Sample 314 306 160 86
All Z Operators 36 35 18 10
% Assets 30 40 21 9
% Debt 3 32 40 25
Source: Farm Finance Survey, March 1984, Iowa Department of Agriculture e
*Totals may not equal 100 due to rounding errors
**Size Category 
Very Small
Small
Medium
Large
Assets
Under $50,000 
$50,000 -■ $199,999 
$200,000 - $999,999
$1,000,000 and over
